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１． Introduction
“Inequality: the Basis of society. We combined and put 
things in common to protect the weak against the strong” 
(Lord John Acton, 1848). How can we achieve the state of 
wellbeing in Malaysia as the same condition as Lord John 
Acton pronounced 170 years ago? Fiscal federalism is the 
path to derive the answer. Malaysia is a federal state (Federal 
Constitution, Article 1(1), 2019, p. 13), where federal (or 
national) government shares power and responsibility with its 
states.
Like in any other countries with a market-based economic 
system, the allocation of resources in Malaysia becomes 
efficient when Pareto optimal is attained in production 
possibilities frontier. Pareto optimal is the condition when 
no one can be better off without making other people worse 
off in the allocation of resources. The following illustrates 
an example. Two individuals X and Y are assumed to live in 
Federation of Harapan where a reallocation of resource for X 
does not affect Y at all is thus a situation where X has achieved 
the condition of Pareto optimal. The condition of Pareto 
efficiency is also adaptable for measuring utility of X and Y too. 
This means utility possibilities curve can substitute production 
possibilities frontier. Welfare economics stipulates̶in a 
competitive market̶X and Y have achieved Pareto optimal 
in utility when their marginal rate of transformation is equal 
to each individual’s marginal rate of substitution. However, 
Pareto optimal in utility does not guarantee the outcome of 
fairness for assuring the highest state of economic welfare in 
the society. This weakness is correctable in order to ensure 
the attainment of the desirable situation, viz., fairness, when 
economic welfare is at the highest level where indifference 
utility possibilities curves of X and Y intersect. This desirable 
situation is Pareto optimal for X’s and Y’s utility. Although this 
example is the simplified illustration of the society in reality, it 
is not an exaggeration to say that fiscal federalism is in fact the 
means to facilitate redistribution of income from the wealthy 
to the poor under the condition of Pareto optimal and fairness. 
Pareto optimal and fairness is a dual goal for the normative 
analysis in welfare economics.
Federalism is in fact de jure but it is practically de facto 
a centralized government tax system in Malaysia since 
independence. The Federal Constitution Part VII Chapter 
1, Chapter 2 (pp. 89-101, pp. 187-189), Tenth Schedule (pp. 
203-206) specify financial provision for national and state 
governments but the formation and the execution of fiscal 
policy was and still is practically centrally controlled by 
national government. The trade off between efficiency and 
fairness is not inevitable. Their conflict is avoidable if the 
condition for efficiency and fairness are harmonized according 
to the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics as 
elucidated in earlier paragraph. Pareto efficiency and fairness 
are desirable on one hand, and both are mutually inclusive 
and mutually reinforcing on other hand. The present state of 
affairs, with a centralized fiscal policy, still has not deliver the 
desirable wellbeing in terms of Pareto efficient and fairness 
for Malaysia’s society.
Fiscal federalism is the subject matter that is contentious 
between de facto advocates and de jure proponents in both 
sides of the aisle. Ceteris paribus, the navigation on ethical, 
political, and a broader scope of social issues landscape is 
certainly a herculean task. But, constitutionally and also for 
enhancing the identity of the reborn homeland, the government 
and rakyat in Malaysia Baru are in need of a fiscal system that 
can foster their endeavors in securing not only desirable but 
also a higher welfare standard set up by efficiency, fairness, 
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effectiveness, equity, and social justice. For this purpose, 
issues pertinent to fiscal federalism must be examined from 
both side of the equation, i.e., government revenue and 
government expenditure. Parliament is granted that authority 
by the Federal Constitution. Against this backdrop, this paper 
intends to examine how fiscal federalism can facilitate the 
desirable state of resource allocations that brings a better 
wellbeing in national and states level.
２． Centralization ratio of federal and state 
governments’ expenditure
The scope of fiscal federalism is not necessarily definite. 
The conventional measurement is to compute the intensity 
of centralization of fiscal resources. Hence fiscal federalism 
varies across federal states. The intensity is defined as the ratio 
of national government’s and state governments’ expenditures 
except transfer made to other governmental units (Fisman and 
Gatti, 2002, p. 340, cited in Rosen and Gayer, 2014, pp. 499-
500). Put differently, centralization ratio explains the extent of 
the federal government’s authority has upon state governments’ 
freedom in approving the priority of expenditures (Rosen and 
Gayer, op. cit., p. 499). The ratio is 8.70% and 7.42% in 2016, 
2017, respectively (Table 2). For comparison, France, Canada, 
the US is 81%, 43%, and 48%, respectively, in early 2000s 
(Rosen and Gayer, op. cit. p. 499). Consolidated government 
revenues increased substantially in 2017 but consolidated state 
government revenues increased only a little more than 0.3%. 
Although this slight rise is from 2016 to 2017, undoubtedly in 
preceding years the degree of centralization was similar because 
the practice was repeated, so called precedent, every year by 
the previous coalition government, viz., Barisan Nasional̶
the most ardent advocate for centralization, since 1973. The 
record of fiscal policy shows that it is not an exaggeration to 
say the present state of practice in Malaysia is the extension of 
a highly centralized fiscal system. This problem was created 
not because of but was in spite of the federalism [guaranteed] 
by the Federal Constitution since the formation of Malaysia. 
Hence, in looking forward to consolidating the reborn 
Malaysia, the urgent need for transforming to a clear and a 
decentralized fiscal federalism in long horizon is undoubtedly 
of paramount importance for the struggle of achieving the 
sustained process of efficient, fair, equitable and just social 
economic progress.
Income redistribution using revenue (direct and indirect 
taxes) and expenditure (grant and transfer, development 
expenditure) is a powerful and an effective method for 
correcting disparity between states. This correction improves 
equitable income distribution. However, presently and 
previously in Malaysia, consolidated national and state 
governments financial positions have not caused concrete 
improvement in equitable income redistribution. This study 
examines it by using the Gini coefficient̶a metric for 
inequality̶in Malaysia in 2017 and 2018 in terms of per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP) and population of 13 
states and 3 Federal Territories. The value is 0.489 and 0.490 
for 2017 and 2018, respectively. This metric has declined from 
2017 but its magnitude is neglible. The degree of inequality 
is dependent on the mean and the variance of per capita 
GDP. Per capita income is directly influenced by the size of 
population in each state/Federal Territory. A better equitable 
income distribution, after income redistribution by fiscal 
policy, is of utmost importance for a multi-racial country. 
Otherwise, inter racial conflicts can be easily instigated, which 
disrupts the united harmonious society of pluralism. Standard 
deviation̶the spread of per capita income from the mean̶of 
per capital GDP in this calculation in 2017 and 2018 is RM204 
and RM208, respectively. If we assume standard deviation 
can explain 25% of Gini index then the disparity gap can 
improve by about RM50 toward the mean. This correction 
means standard deviation is decreased to roughly RM154 
and RM158 in 2017 and 2018, respectively. The amount that 
is required to add to the income redistribution is about RM 
1,600 million per year in 2017 and 2018, respectively. The 
additional income re-transfer is equivalent to about 8% of 
Consolidated States Governments financial position in each 
corresponding year. While the size of additional transfer from 
national to state governments help to improve inequality but 
in reality it still does not help in reducing the centralization 
ratio significantly. Thus it is both urgent and imperative to 
completely re-examine how fiscal federalism can contribute 
and also what is the minimum amount of redistribution can 
help in strengthening decentralization. These efforts in turn 
will bring about desirable level of fairness, equitable, socially 
just, effective and efficient allocation of fiscal resources for the 
purpose of enhancing a better wellbeing of the society at large 
in coming years.
３． Fiscal federalism and decentralization of 
economic responsibility
The insistence for centralizing economic responsibility in 
national government rather than delegating a desirable larger 
portion of it to local governments was and still is entrenched 
by a small group of “elites” who are overwhelmingly self-
interested in their own personal profit and political power. 
Without dispute, federal government is responsible for national 
defense, foreign affairs, building national infrastructure, 
international trade and commerce, money supply, currency 
and foreign exchange, immigration, postal, communications, 
broadcasting, air travel, social services, pension, delivery 
of other public goods and services of national nature. These 
activities are presently being categorized into operating 
expenditure and development expenditure. On the contrary, 
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decentralizing economic responsibility on social services 
(education and training, health, housing), the construction of 
infrastructure in a state level, public security in state level, and 
delivery of goods and service of local characteristics in state 
level is still contentious even though there is a redistribution 
of financial transfers from central government in the form of 
grants and transfers and development expenditures. Hence the 
crucial question to be answered is: How to divide economic 
responsibility between national and state governments that can 
provide a higher level of efficiency and fairness? The answer 
ought to encompass, at least, a socially just initiative in income 
redistribution that places resolute focus on cooperative or 
supportive relationship in the allocation of fiscal resources from 
national government to every state authority that consolidates 
Pareto efficiency and fairness for every Malaysian.
In a democratic country, the decision of establishing and 
of executing fiscal federalism, which is [guaranteed by the 
Federal Constitution], is politically doable. The task is not 
difficult because advantages are greater than disadvantages. 
Malaysian citizens or more specifically voters certainly 
support this political decision because it is constitutionally 
correct. In a simplified election form, political decision is 
influenced by voters who choose the best representative in their 
constituent who can maximize their utility while their choice 
is reciprocated by each candidate’s desire to receive majority 
votes. Hence a candidate will undoubtedly position him or her 
in a situation where the majority votes are concentrated in the 
middle distribution of preferences so that it is also a situation 
where at the same time the best preference of voters could 
be satisfied. This voting behavior is called “the median voter 
theorem.” Unanimous agreement in an election is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible (unless in a dictatorial regime 
where there is no democracy). Therefore, for the hypothetical 
Federation of Harapan, the outcome of the desirability for the 
amount of a public good (or a set of public goods) for two 
individuals X and Y with respect to each burden of tax share is 
the same as the mechanism of demand and supply curves that 
are constructed based on quantity and price in the competitive 
market. Graphically, the vertical axis is tax burden (in ratio of 
income) and the horizontal axis is the quantity of a public good 
both X and Y each desires to get. Then the actual quantity of 
a public good is determined by the intersection of the demand 
curve of X with that of Y. That point of equilibrium is the tax 
burden for X and Y, respectively. Even though the respective 
ratio in income share is mutually opposite (i.e., if X was high 
then Y was low, or vice versa). This mechanism is explained 
by Lindahl’s hypothesis.
Fiscal federalism characterizes in Boadway’s words 
(2017): “An important feature of federations is the extent 
of cooperation between levels of government. Much of the 
fiscal federalism literature emphasizes non-cooperative 
or competitive decision-making, and asks whether 
intergovernmental competition is beneficial or not” (Boadway, 
2017, p. 2). He then underlines:
 “Tiebout (1956) had argued that competition 
among government, analogous to that among firms, 
contributed to efficient levels of public goods and 
taxation, and efficient allocations of population” 
(Boadway, op. cit., p. 2).
The advantages are, among other things, enhanced 
intergovernmental competition, the promotion of delivering 
goods and services that are innovative and creative to people 
who live in states or local regions. These are in fact public 
services that suit the taste of local people. The opponents 
are skeptical. They caution that fiscal federalism exacerbates 
efficiency and equitable distribution of public goods and 
services. Their warning is exaggerated, if not it was cooked 
up to fool all rakyat. Although disadvantages have merit but 
representatives in the federal level are able to mitigate, if not to 
eliminate them entirely. The theorems of welfare economics, 
viz., Pareto efficiency and fairness, can insulate disadvantages 
in fiscal federalism by the desirable income redistribution by 
means of shared responsibility in revenues and expenditure 
between national and local governments. The trade off is 
arguable but it is not an irremovable hindrance because 
Lindahl’s model points out clearly that this is not a zero sum 
game but a positive one instead even though shared burden of 
tax in income ratio is different for every category of income 
brackets. This logic is justifiable because the utility of each 
citizen lies on the same indifferent curve of the utility function 
on one hand, whereas high proportion of citizen can achieve 
fairness in utilizing public goods and services provided by 
state governments through fiscal federalism on other hand.
The debate of advantages and disadvantages of fiscal 
federalism can go on indefinitely but the most important 
question to answer is: how to establish fiscal federalism that 
symbolizes the right of Rakyat in Federation Malaysia under 
the Federal Constitution, viz., government of, government by 
and government for the people. These are the Three Principles 
of the People. The constitutional right is unshakable and they 
ought to become the most important foundation of Malaysia 
Baru in navigating in a vast ocean where sometimes even a 
changeable weather influences high wind and waves along 
with huge storms are predictable but to a certain extent the 
degree of uncertainty varies from time to time. Looking 
forward, even the sail is rough in the voyage, the mindset of 
every Rakyat still desires to arrive at the destiny where fiscal 
federalism, based on the Three Principles of the People, is in 
place for the long lasting politic, economic and social progress 
engraved in pluralistic Malaysia.
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４． Issues of welfare economics in fiscal federalism
（１）Market failure
Market failures cause inefficient allocation of resources. 
Market fails in the coordination of demand and supply because 
of market power (viz., monopoly and oligopoly), externality 
(positive and negative), and information failure (imperfect 
and asymmetry). Market power dictates prices of goods and 
services. Thus government ought to intervene to prohibit 
monopoly and oligopoly by setting price level (i.e., price 
ceiling and price floor) through legislations and/or regulations. 
Externality is an action by an individual or a group of people 
that affects another person or another group of people 
positively or negatively. This mechanism is also known as the 
spillover effect. The former relates to the relationship between 
personal marginal benefit-social marginal benefit and private 
marginal cost-social marginal cost. For example, education, 
health care and clean environment such as clean air, hygienic 
water and garbage free public spaces are notable areas where 
positive externality is generated.
In the case of education, every student’s private marginal 
benefit is in equilibrium with his/her private marginal 
cost because that point is where the demand of education 
(determined by personal private marginal benefit) intersects 
with the supply (by personal marginal cost that equates with 
social marginal cost too). In this equilibrium state, social 
benefit is larger than social marginal benefit cost even the price 
for education has risen for accommodating larger beneficiaries 
in society at large. In a competitive market, a larger number of 
people will not choose to invest in education because the cost 
is higher. This situation defeats the positive outcome for the 
society at large that generated by more educated people. This 
is a market failure. In order to prevent this from happening, 
government ought to intervene by providing subsidy in 
education so that a larger number of people can attend schools 
at lower investment costs. The subsidy practically fills the gap 
between a lower tuition fee and the different between a market 
price (i.e., tuition fee) set by the intersection between social 
marginal benefit and social marginal cost (which has similar 
value as private marginal cost). Health care and mitigation 
of environmental problems function in similar way too. The 
former generates healthy people while the latter gives a cleaner 
environment for the society at large.
The problem of free rider is also a market failure. This 
problem especially prevails in pure public goods and services. 
A pure public good is non rivalrous and non excludable in 
consumption. Clean air is a pure public good because no one 
can deny another person or group of people from enjoying it. 
When an individual enjoys smoking cigarettes in public space, 
he or she is a free rider if there was no smoking restriction. 
Government can prevent a free rider from exploiting 
unavoidable property of non-rivalrous and non-excludability 
in polluting clean air by using law for imposing punishment. 
Information failures occur in two distinct different 
ways. Firstly, imperfect information occurs when institution 
and organization are not functioning satisfactory caused 
by the lower development level in a developing country. 
In an advanced country, the society also faces this type of 
problem because of institutional dysfunction and restriction of 
information access. As a consequence, this situation impedes 
information processing by the people at large. Secondly, 
asymmetric information occurs widely in “lemon market,” 
insurance (life and property) market, labor market, banking 
and capital market. Hence government ought to correct 
market failures due to information failures. Intervention can 
come in the form of regulation, compliance, transparency, 
accountability and other related rules that are put in place to 
prohibit intentional actions in causing information failures.
（２）Market to support the poor does not exist
The assertion that market exists naturally for every good or 
service is not true. Income redistribution by reallocating taxes 
paid from a wealthier group of citizens to poorer people is 
one of the most acceptable means for helping the poor. This 
redistribution is the key channel for the purpose of transferring 
fiscal resources for improving living standards of poor 
beneficiaries. However, market does not exist for facilitating 
the transfer of income tax from richer people in the form of 
income subsidy for the poor. This study assumes that poverty 
in the poorer cohort in B40 is an externality to the society at 
large. There is no market to facilitate the redistribution of a 
portion of tax revenues to them. This problem is critically 
impairing poorer of the poor or it has caused those people 
who live in dismal economic situation to become increasingly 
stressful. Providing additional subsidy̶the context of income 
redistribution̶to support these financially vulnerable citizens 
is not only politically and economic viable but the decision 
is even socially just. In this regard, there is practically no 
economic agent who intends to act voluntarily in donating 
even RM10 to vulnerable people. A huge proportion of private 
donation is mainly attributed to philanthropists, private 
foundations, wealthy individuals, charitable organizations 
established by individuals, non-governmental organizations, 
community-based groups or social development groups 
created by like-minded individuals. But their altruistic efforts 
are still not able to influence the formation of supply curve 
because there is no such type of market for helping the poor. 
Therefore without a market then there is no “invisible hand” 
for coordinating income redistribution or financial support 
from the rich to the poor. The fate of Malaysia Baru on the new 
elevation where there is plentiful of efficient, fair and socially 
just progress lies in the hands of every citizen who cares, 
tolerates, just and enthusiastic in accomplishing the journey. 
This sail might be rough but it is certainly a politically and 
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practically doable navigation.
５． Designing fiscal federalism
（１）Rationale
Taxes are necessary and unavoidable in any country because 
of the need to receive public goods and services. The crucial 
concern in taxation is fairness regarding the burden of tax. 
Fairness is different from equality if job descriptions were 
the same. In other words, a worker ought to receive a higher 
payroll because of more works than other workers who 
worked less in the same job category. This outcome is fair 
whereas workers were given equal opportunity, i.e., equality, 
for undertaking tasks. “If any one bears less than his fair share 
of the burden, some other person must suffer more than his 
share, and the alleviation to the one is not, ceteris paribus, so 
great a good to him, as the increased pressure upon the other is 
an evil. Equality of taxation, therefore, as a maxim of politics, 
means equality of sacrifice” (John Stuart Mill, 1866, p. 804). 
Hence a diligent worker has to sacrifice a portion of his or her 
income by the burden of higher income tax. The sacrifice is 
bigger if income was higher. Just like the burden of personal 
income tax and other indirect taxes, the allocation of revenue 
and expenditure also faces challenges from national and state 
governments especially from advocates who are most ardent 
for centralization against peers who insist in giving a higher 
allocation to the poorer state governments in order to improve 
equalization. The challenge is understandable but this does 
not mean parliamentarians ought to keep the de facto fiscal 
system that is highly centralized and quite easily being abused 
by special interest groups. Hence the justly correction is the 
sine qua non of fiscal federalism. Needless to say, the task is 
easier said than done. Legislation has to work out within the 
framework of the Federal Constitution with the minimum 
number of amendment or revision and/or adding new Article 
to ensure the legislature power in the oversight of revenue and 
expenditure under fiscal federalism.
（２）Fundamental approach at national level
For corporate and individual income taxes, beside tax 
fairness, the collection of tax revenues lies on at least two 
basic requirements, i.e., progressive and regressive tax rates. 
These principles must also give emphasis on the aspects of 
horizontal equity, vertical equity and generational equity. The 
role at national level is two-fold: first, they ought to ensure 
the consistency of these principles and requirements are in 
line with the Federal Constitution; second, they ought to make 
political decisions with regard to the range of income tax rates 
(corporate and personal incomes) assign to the lowest to the 
highest bracket progressively. In this regard, progressive tax 
rates are directly tied to vertical equity and horizontal equity. 
The former clearly means higher income group pays higher 
taxes than people who earn lesser. The latter implies similar 
tax rate for people who are in the same income bracket. 
Practically, progressive tax rate means any taxpayer’s marginal 
tax rate is higher than their average tax rate. Legislation 
can, like previously, delegate the operational aspect of tax 
collections to Inland Revenue Board. As explained, parliament 
ought to use these fundamental principles to define the degree 
of fairness and equality of taxpayers’ tax burden. Otherwise, 
they are against the strong expectation of voters who have 
elected them.
For achieving a better level of fairness and equality in 
direct tax areas, real property gains tax (or capital gains tax) 
plays a crucial role in narrowing the gap between the rich 
and poor. This redistribution is also the means for enhancing 
generational equity. This direct tax is already put in place but 
tax rates and corresponding disposal period (i.e., the period 
from the time of purchase to the time of disposal) ought to 
revise upward. For example, 30% tax rate for less than three 
years, 20% for the fourth year, 15% for the fifth year, 5% for 
the 6th year and beyond, can be revised to 50% for less than 6 
years, 40% for 7th year, 35% for 8th year, 30% for 9th year, 25% 
for 10th year, 15% for 11th year and beyond. Equally crucial, 
a higher tax rate for initial 6 years also prevents speculation 
in real estates while subsequent tax rates are for the purpose 
of enhancing generational equity in terms of redistributing 
capital gains tax to the same cohort of people who earned less 
and thus they can only own less or none at all in assets. At the 
same time, this design in fact lessens the disparity gap between 
the cohorts of next generation as they move up their social 
standings by motivation, hard work and dedication.
Presently, national government does not tax gift, wealth, 
estate, and inheritance. For these reasons, the disparity between 
“have” and “have not” is expanding along with economic 
growth because the rich make more in tangible and intangible 
assets as their income and assets expand faster and their asset 
values rise higher in economic growth. This is the classical case 
of “money makes more money.” The “have not” are shaking 
their heads miserably by watching the rich people’s game of 
“money makes more money.” Do we want to become the silent 
audience? The answer is no. It is of utmost importance that 
Malaysia ought to put in place these instruments so that more 
resources are available for mitigating inequality̶especially 
in vertical equity̶and also for improving fairness by income 
redistribution. Also, it is worthy to note these taxes also bring 
about Pareto improvement in resource allocation between the 
rich and poor.
Stamp duty is also another area for revision. Property 
transfer is 1% for first RM100,000, it is subsequently increased 
to 2% and 3% for next RM400,000 and excess of RM500,000, 
respectively. These tax rates are disproportionate because 
richer people instead of paying higher duty, they are in fact 
paying relatively low average tax than the poorer people (whose 
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property transfers are most likely lie below RM100,000). 
Take property transfer of three individuals in the sequence of 
RM100,000, RM500,000, and RM2,000,000 as an example. 
The value of the second and of the third individual is 5 and 20 
multiples of the first individual but their average tax rate is in 
the sequence of 1%, 1.8%, and 2.7%. The different is 1.8 and 
2.7 multiples of the first individual. This experiment clearly 
shows present stamp duty generates larger vertical inequality. 
Hence these tax rates ought to be revised with progressively 
higher tax rates so that not only vertical equality is improved 
but also the enlarged tax revenue is used for improved income 
redistribution to the poorer citizens. If similar practice is also 
applied in gift, wealth, estate, and inheritance taxes, positive 
outcomes are realistic as demonstrated in earlier example.
Collection of indirect taxes such as sales and service tax, 
export duty, import duty and excise duty are the jurisdiction 
of Royal Malaysian Customs Department. Tax rates are 
reasonable but still have a sufficient space for improvement. 
Export duty is required especially for natural resources 
because it fills the differential between production costs and 
international market prices to prevent resource curse that 
drives up exchange rate, which in turn negatively affects 
manufacturing exports in price competiveness. In import front, 
national government ought to narrow the range for import duty 
because this indirect tax inhibits stronger economic linkages 
or integration with the rest of the world. The inhibition comes 
in the form of loss economic welfare (smaller consumer and 
producer surpluses and also deadweight loss) caused by higher 
domestic prices after tax instead of allowing citizens to benefit 
from lower international prices. If taxes were unavoidable 
then there is a need to channel a share of tax revenues to 
research and development or equivalent activities that will 
strengthen labor productivity to offset the welfare loss. In this 
context, parliament ought to organize periodical dialogues 
with industrialists, business representatives, scholars and 
public intellectuals to set the priority of allocating resources in 
strengthening this area of policy actions.
To a certain extent, same argument applies to excise 
duty. However, taxes of demerit goods such as cigarette and 
alcohol̶that create negative externality̶can reduce the 
quantity by imposing higher prices for correcting market 
failures. This situation is similar to environmental problems. 
The consumption of demerit goods is reduced because 
marginal social benefit (less than marginal private benefit) 
intersects with marginal private cost (equals to marginal social 
cost) and marginal social cost by using a sin tax instrument. 
This situation theoretically generates welfare loss but the 
question is to ask what is the size of the reduction in healthcare 
expenditures contributed by a larger number of healthier 
citizens. This is not the debate on pro and con but it relates to 
the benefit derives from sin tax in terms of lower healthcare 
expenditure. Sin tax can create special interest groups thus to 
avoid this negative outcome, national legislators can replace it 
by setting minimum prices for demerit goods. Skeptics might 
argue otherwise. But this method is applied not because of the 
source of revenue. Rather it can actually eliminate negative 
spill over, which in turn creates a greater good to the society 
at large where income redistribution improves efficiency and 
also enhances socially fair and just in reallocation of resources.
Luxury tax does not exist but it is lump into sales and 
service tax. Luxury cars and other extravagance goods 
are taxed by higher rates. However, these tax rates are not 
necessarily proportionate (similar to stamp duty). Therefore, 
instead of a different tax rate for a successive price bracket in 
present set up, a new luxury tax regime provides clearer and 
accountable tax charges from the perspective of using those 
revenues for income redistribution from the wealthier people 
to the poorer strata of citizens. 
Present tax regime for use taxes such as gasoline tax, 
highway toll, and public facility use fee are reasonable but 
subsidy from national government needs to be eliminated 
when investment amount is recovered. After that point, fees 
ought to be collected for each usage category so that its 
revenues is used for maintaining use of public infrastructures 
by every citizen comfortably, viz., a well defined users-pay 
principle that is transparent and fair. Parliament must work on 
this area in order to ensure results are achieved as anticipated.
（３） Rooms for improvement in proportional tax 
schemes
Employees Provident Fund (EPF) and unemployment insurance 
are taxes in the category of proportional equity. Legislators at 
national level have an obligation to ensure efficient, effective, 
and fair functioning of these institutions regardless of the 
choice of centralized fiscal system or fiscal federalism. In 
any case, this does not create a contentious debate between 
representatives and voters. Following paragraphs explain the 
details.
Practically, EPF is a force savings rather than a federal tax. 
Its performance has been satisfactorily for both employed and 
self-employed. However, it is worthy to say what is good today 
can certainly do better tomorrow if better management styles 
for operations and a higher quality of professional expertise 
to oversee investment portfolios in terms of the selection, 
monitoring, and the divestment are introduced. Although EPF 
is a federal statutory institution, for the purpose of monitoring, 
parliament certainly can ask for a quarterly operational report 
in the oversight committee in parliament. This committee can 
expand its mandates to ask business leaders, professionals, 
public intellectuals, scholars, representatives of unions to give 
suggestions for at least: one, how to improve the operational 
(with regard to Account I and Account II and other pertinent 
issues) and investment aspects; next, is the monthly payout for 
every beneficiary is appropriate for a decent living and also 
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whether the withdrawal age is consistent with legal retirement 
age and the prolonged longevity of each beneficiary. EPF 
is a force savings thus a prolong period of employment (in 
physically and mentally healthy condition) does not defeat the 
purpose as long as his/her payroll is affordable for a descent 
living. A larger pool of workers certainly facilitate a sustained 
economic growth whereas a beneficiary continuously receives 
a payroll does not lower the scale of private final consumption, 
which in fact has a positive feedback to growth too.
Unemployment insurance is a vital social safety net. 
In short, for a certain period (e.g., it ranges from 90 to 360 
days in Japan), it provides a benefit of monetary value in 
cash and a certain type of unemployed individual can receive 
support such as re-training, job search matching or/and 
information sharing and other relevant benefits in order to be 
reemployed. Malaysia introduced unemployment insurance 
scheme this year. Similar to EPF, employees and employers 
share proportionally in paying insurance fee. Every month a 
worker pays 0.2% of salary whereas an employer pays 0.4%. 
The benefit of insured workers in unemployed period, he or 
she receives 30-80% of monthly salary as severance and also 
receives financial support for job search and re-training. There 
are still disagreements regarding the principle of proportional 
share in paying insurance fees as well as whether the scheme 
will deliver benefits as stipulated by the scheme. Behaviors 
like agree to disagree, disagree to agree, and refusal of burden 
sharing by employers due to cost happen quite common in a 
democratic country. Every citizen or worker/employer has the 
right to agree or to disagree or to refuse but from all dimensions 
the opponents do not have an alternative but to grudgingly 
accept the majority decision because the law is legislated 
in Parliament where elected representatives are obliged to 
fulfill responsibility to their voters. In spite of this political 
reality, all kind of complaints will still go on indefinitely. This 
shortcoming is inevitable but it is not catastrophic because in 
Winston Churchill’s words: “No one pretends that democracy 
is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is 
the worst form of Government except for all those other forms 
that have been tried from time to time” (Churchill, 1947). 
Having said that, however, Malaysian citizens especially 
workers and employers will undoubtedly expect a practical 
and effective scheme. Therefore parliament certainly has to 
constantly play a crucial role in making certain the safety net 
provides care to rakyat who have lost their jobs.
（４）Fair and equitable income redistribution
Fiscal federalism, res ipsa loquitur, must at least focus on 
strengthening fiscal relation in a cooperative manner between 
national and state governments in tandem with efficient and 
fair redistribution of fiscal resources between them. The 
former is already stated in Section 3. The latter refers to the 
role of national government in undertaking fiscal equalization 
between states. Every state is clearly obliged to provide public 
goods and services but the concern is none other than the 
financial capability of each state. Every state in our federation 
generates its own fiscal revenues but disparity between one 
another is unavoidable because of different economic capacity. 
National government has worked extremely hard to dilute 
the disparity between states and also between itself and state 
governments. In spite of dedicated efforts, centralization 
ratio remains high and Gini coefficient in terms of per capital 
GDP has yet to show impressive improvement. Hence, can 
every representative stay out of this spectrum of challenges 
in political economy? Running away is not a choice. Rakyat 
in general and voters in particular want a better tomorrow 
that is of the greater good to Malaysian society at large. 
Fiscal federalism is the sine qua non. Persistent let down and 
discontent of rakyat caused by national government insistence 
on de facto tax system will only create a disunited Malaysia 
Baru. 
Necessary condition is already in place for the Federal 
Constitution has in principle guaranteed the administration 
of federal tax system. The shift to decentralizing national 
government by delegating a higher level of responsibility to 
state governments requires a politically acceptable sufficient 
condition, of which state governments, rakyat or voters 
are favorably anticipating positively. This study intends to 
suggest three areas that will launch fiscal federalism. These 
are: an improved method for equitable, fair and socially 
just redistribution of fiscal revenues from national to state 
governments; health and medical supports of proportional 
equity to every rakyat; support of B40 group by conditional 
cash transfer programs.
（a）Fiscal equalization
The first area deals with fiscal equalization between states 
because of two crucial problems. First, national and state 
governments consolidated financial position has a high 
centralization ratio. Second, different economic capacity in 
generating local fiscal revenues because of uneven economic 
endowments and development level in each state certainly 
requires additional transfer or redistribution from national 
government. The key principles are equitable, fair and socially 
just. Equally crucial, the effort of fiscal equalization has to 
produce Pareto improvement in resource reallocations from 
national to local governments. The second component in this 
area will resolve the challenge poses by the first component. 
This paper uses fiscal expenditures of State Governments 
in 2017 to demonstrate how fiscal equalization is logically 
doable.
Table 3 shows the result of this empirical example. 
Although the sample has only 13 states but financial 
expenditures from them were converted to a normally 
distributed sample by using T-score (mean is 5 and standard 
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deviation is 1). Then the gap between transformed value and 
actual expenditure in 2017 for each state is showed in the 
share of actual total expenditure. This share is multiplied 
by the computed total amount of additional fiscal resources 
(i.e., total value of 13 states) so as to determine the needed 
amount of additional redistribution from national government 
to each local government based on earlier calculated normally 
distributed spread (i.e., T-score). Additional redistributed fiscal 
resources are added to actual expenditure in 2017 produced 
a better and an even more appropriate fiscal position by this 
method of equalization. Total amount required to add more 
fiscal resources to local governments is RM122.66 billion, 
which raised total expenditure level in local governments to 
RM151.36 billion. This scale is significantly more desirable to 
rakyat. The total amount of additional transfer is about 6 times 
of that in 2017. The newly total amount of fiscal expenditure 
in this example shows centralization ratio has improved from 
7.42% to 57.04%. The result shows fiscal equalization in fiscal 
federalism has strengthen decentralization from national to 
local governments. Equally important, transforming actual 
expenditures to a normal distributed spread actually ensures 
the redistribution enhances equality, fairness and socially 
just outcome in Malaysia Baru. Moreover, this method also 
logically promotes Pareto efficiency. That is a condition that 
should not be tampered with in this new redistribution. This 
new fiscal equalization does not interfere but it in fact assists 
in adding higher impact on the customary distribution of 
grants and transfers and development expenditures to state 
governments.
（b）Universal health care system
In the area of health and medical support to rakyat, universal 
health care (UHC) system does not exist in Malaysia yet. 
Although the intention is being strongly promoted by Ministry 
of Health and a wide spectrum of civil society organizations 
but the journey for establishing the proposed institution is 
still at present a long and winding one. Dzulkefly said: "We 
recognize that UHC is about equity and access to healthcare 
services for all, without them incurring catastrophic financial 
hardship" (The Star Online, 21 May 2019). He further stressed: 
“However, its out of pocket (OOP) expenditure stood at 
38% in 2018 although the WHO recommends that the OOP 
expenditure should be at around 20%” (The Star Online, op. 
cit.). These statements exemplify the present unsatisfactory 
condition of health and medical support that requires urgent 
attention from parliamentarians in Malaysia Baru.
 Malaysia was ranked 57th in Human Development Index 
(HDI) in 2017. HDI is a “statistical metric being used for 
measuring a country’s overall achievement in its social and 
economic dimensions (UNDP, 1990, p. 109). UNDP defines 
“this index is a composite of three crucial indicators, viz., life 
expectancy at birth (i.e., life expectancy index), knowledge 
accumulated over expected years of schooling and means year 
of schooling (i.e., education index), and a decent standard 
of living (i.e., GNI̶gross national income̶per capita in 
US Dollar purchasing power parity̶PPP)” (UNDP, op. cit., 
p.109). Between 2009 and 2017, although Malaysia spent quite 
a higher GDP share in education but the shares in health and 
social welfare were quite lower when compared with other 
countries that were ranked higher in HDI (Lau, 2019, p. 10). 
In sailing to a healthier and a more secure living environment, 
Malaysia crucially requires relentless efforts in overcoming 
high tides in the sea of health and social welfare. Without 
any doubt, this is an important policy issue. By and large, a 
higher per capita income raises people’s aspiration to pursuit 
stronger physical and mental health, which in turn lengthens 
their longevity.
UHC is the ground floor of enhanced health and medical 
care. It ought to allow all citizens to receive health and medical 
assistance in the case of illness (physically and mentally), 
injury, and other threats to health. Also, private insurance 
schemes in reality can add force to health and medical care 
for every rakyat is equally important. This part is especially 
encouraging for those rakyat who are affordable. For UHC, 
every beneficiary is obliged to pay the insurance premium in 
order to acquire the entitlement of receiving assistance. On the 
other hand, affordable persons can concurrently buy additional 
insurance from private insurance entities. Hence private 
insurance schemes sit on the second floor above UHC̶the 
ground floor.
UHC is a mutual assistance among members. In the 
nutshell, UHC performs the provision of health and medical 
assistance to members from the pooling of insurance premium. 
The premium can be determined proportionately to income 
brackets. This method strengthens both vertical and horizontal 
equity. Wealthier people might not want to associate with 
UHC because they are affordable. However, in the context 
of operational efficiency, it is not necessary to ask and wait. 
Instead, legislate UHC as a compulsory insurance for every 
rakyat without solicitation. In order to prevent inefficient 
troubles with rakyat, the legislation can include an “Op-out” 
clause for wealthier citizens. If there was no formal submission 
of “Op-out” forms then insurance payment is still mandatory. 
Intuitively, skeptics will certainly argue UHC will not work. 
This logic is not well founded. There was no UHC in Malaysia 
in last six decades. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration at all in 
objecting that baseless logic.
Effective, efficient, and fair operation of UHC is really 
not complicated. But this system must not be centrally 
managed because of at least two reasons. Firstly, Federation 
of Malaysia is not an authoritarian state and thus centrally 
based information storing and processing are costly and 
ineffective. Digital economy and the emerging Industry 4.0 are 
classical illustrations. They clearly show every connectivity is 
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decentralized and the system overall does not perform well with 
command by the center and then reaction from subordinates or 
branches. Secondly, in reality, one must not assumes utility or 
preference is uniform in every state. Because of differences 
in utility in every state, tastes and choices for food, type of 
exercises, work and leisure activities are different. Hence the 
condition of physical and mental health, the type of illness, and 
other unanticipated health threats vary in every state. These 
local specifics demand prompt responses and quick effective 
treatments. Hence the delegation of operational responsibility 
is crucial. These two elements indeed are mutually reinforcing. 
First and foremost, legislation has to enact a law for 
establishing UHC. This law also must clearly spell out the 
do and don’t so that it ensures the sound operation of UHC. 
This must be consistent to the goal for the enhancement of 
every rakyat’s health. Unlike private insurance schemes, 
UHC ought to have the minimum coverage encompassing 
treatments for physical and mental health, illness and other 
threats to human health. These provisions ought to be equal 
for every beneficiary regardless of premium cost with respect 
to different income brackets. Equally important, prudence and 
due diligence in approving claims are crucial keys to prevent 
deficit between premium income and expenditures (insurance 
payout and administrative cost). If deficit has arisen then 
financial injections from national government is unavoidable. 
But this situation creates unnecessary fiscal burden. This 
problem is preventable. We can initially assume insurance 
premium is pooled into three categories, viz., insurance payout, 
operational expenses, and investments for expanding financial 
values of the collected insurance premiums. Using a portion of 
the second category to activities that promotes the awareness 
of good physical and mental health are certainly helpful in 
reducing cases of insurance payouts in UHC scheme. The 
effective functioning of this aspect will certainly strengthen the 
higher returns from the third category over a longer horizon. 
Later on as the operational aspect of the scheme is functioning, 
parliamentarians can improve the core accordingly if deemed 
necessary to accommodate changes in reality.
For the purpose of decentralization and the adjustment 
of different local preferences in life styles, state governments 
ought to play a central role in the sound management of 
UHC especially with respect to stable financial management, 
efficient implementation of health and medical assistances. By 
law, local governments must ensure appropriate but efficient 
and effective execution matters relating to membership 
(acquisition, disqualification, prevention and avoidance 
of moral hazard), collection of UHC premiums, planning, 
execution and monitoring of health services and other health 
and medical assistance projects under the auspices of UHC. 
Each state must take initiative to organize periodical events 
in promoting the share of experiences relating to the task and 
responsibility with other states and national stakeholders. 
These events of experience sharing will give additional force 
to strengthen health and medical support in UHC.
（c）Support of B40
The third area, the support of B40 group requires assistance 
from national government but the implementation ought to be 
delegated to state governments because B40 is characterized 
by the economic conditions that negatively influence their 
life significantly. Many people stuck in poverty because of 
its vicious cycle. Poor children or youths are unaffordable 
to attend school not in spite of free tuition fee but it is 
because they need to spare their time to assist families in 
doing house errands of which their parents could not attend 
to. Their parents are concerned of how to secure minimum 
income for providing food. There is also a substantial portion 
of youth who have to undertake miscellaneous works for 
compensating household subsistence income. Sadly the scale 
of this compensation is insufficient to offset economic dismal. 
Because many poor children or youth are not educated thus 
employability in formal sector is outrageously low. Inhabitants 
in B40 are not affordable to pay health and medical care thus 
their health condition is not reasonably acceptable. This 
problem compounded with insufficient education have drawn 
down labor productivity, consequently they are persistently 
trapped in low income. Quite a fraction of even poorer B40 
lives in subsistence because of this vicious cycle.
This peculiarity requires special attention from 
government in their locality. Hence, state governments must 
take the responsibility in working together with national 
authority to mitigate the share of B40 group vis-à-vis two 
other higher income groups. The result of this alleviation 
will reflect, at least, in the forms of a better income bracket, 
affordable and respectable education attainment, healthier, 
and buoyant living standard along with their upward social 
mobility. Poverty is a negative externality. Hence if there was 
no positive intervention from government, negative aspects 
certainly exacerbate higher cost to the society at large. Hence, 
mitigation, if not at least prevention, is less costly but effective 
and socially just for improving equity and fairness because 
the results give equal opportunity to people in escaping from 
economic consternation. 
 Market is almost non-existence for coordinating financial 
supply to the poor who inevitably require certain minimum 
income to float above relative poverty line in order to receive 
a respected dignity in their living. Income share of B40 in 
2016 is about 16.4% in 2016. Their mean household income is 
RM2,848 whereas median household income is RM3,000. B40 
earn less than RM3,860, and this group is estimated to have 1.13 
million households and about 4.63 million people. Presently, 
national government is providing financial subsidy in a variety 
of scale in accordance to several income brackets. This aid 
is important but not sustainable because financial burden is 
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quite difficult to become lighter. Put differently, the aid is 
like “pedaling a bicycle,” when the pedaling is stopped then 
recipients fall back to dire economic condition. If averagely 
each household received RM100 per month, the monthly cost 
is RM113 million, and annually the sum is RM1,356 billion. 
This amount is larger than annual expenditures in several 
states. It is unavoidable to utilize fiscal resources, which is a 
form of income redistribution, to support this poor group of 
citizens. But the scarcity of fiscal revenues also needs to place 
important emphasis in other areas too. Hence the competition 
of the scarcity is intense and thus not necessarily efficient and 
sufficiently just in our society.
In order to create better results in B40, the proposed 
fiscal federalism is more effective because local governments 
are more appropriate than national authority in undertaking 
the task. This approach by no mean implies the assistance 
does not require fiscal resources. Instead this paper strongly 
recommends using national fiscal resources for tasking 
state governments to assist B40 in their local districts. This 
method is effective because local administrators have a clearer 
understanding of the core problems engulfing poor citizens. 
Furthermore, this method will become even more efficient 
and equitable by introducing “conditional cash transfer 
(CCT)” to qualified recipients. The World Bank defines CCT 
as “programs provide cash payments to poor households that 
meet certain behavioral requirements, generally related to 
children’s health care and education” (The World Bank, 2019). 
Adapting this method to support B40 is not difficult. The key 
issues are how to make sure that the assistance is delivered 
more effectively, more efficiently and fair in the framework of 
fiscal federalism.
The proposed CCT can work in fiscal federalism in two 
layers. The first layer is to set aside the fund for supporting 
CCT in a statutory agency, which is independent from direct 
administration of central government. The financial source 
can be allocated from tax revenues under the administrative 
scope of national government (e.g., Ministry of Finance). The 
decision in determining which channel or tax must it derives 
from might be controversial but political decision based on 
effective, efficient, equitable, fair and socially just in order to 
make society at large better off is an acceptable rationale to 
large majority of people. What does an individual has to gain 
in refusing the decision? It is wrong to assume no resistance 
but there will certainly has a group of opponents but this 
group is minority. This is not lack of respect because they will 
eventually give support instead of rhetorically say “I told you 
so,” if CCT programs ware successful over time.
The launch of CCT scheme will face a few obstacles. 
The most important one is pertained to the source of financial 
resources. The fastest track comprises two sources. The 
first one is to use a portion of total expenditure after fiscal 
equalized tax revenues. Next one is to use a portion of tax 
revenues collected from sin and luxury taxes. In order to 
determine the contribution from the first track, legislators must 
determine the financial size requires for implementing CCT 
scheme. Data in 2016 is instructive. The highest income per 
household is RM3860 whereas the lowest value is not known 
but we take RM980 (the relative poverty line) as the bottom. 
The gap is RM2,880 per household per month. Because there 
are 1.13 million households in B40 and thus the amount of 
fund requires in filling the gap is about RM39 billion per year. 
This amount is about 24% of total expenditure by the state 
governments after fiscal equalization. It is a political suicide 
if national and state governments decided to cover the whole.
Thus this study suggests the following. The first track 
focuses on a realistic but practical means by the contribution 
of national and state governments. Specifically, parliament 
can decide by law to mandatory allocate 2% of total fiscal 
resources based on fiscal equalized revenues. Using earlier 
empirical example in 2017 to illustrate, the amount is RM3.2 
billion. In order to pool a larger fund, the second track can 
source additional fund from revenues collected from sin tax 
and luxury tax. For the purpose of transparency, accountability 
and predictability, 2% of tax revenue from these two categories 
is not only appropriate but it is also similar magnitude with 
respect to the first track.
The second issue is pertinent and it relates to what is the 
reasonable amount that is fair and socially just in supporting 
B40 households. Parliament can categorize households’ 
monthly income to 5 categories that are consistent to achieving 
proportional equity̶after the CCT supports̶in B40. It is 
not too ambitious but instead it is more realistic to provide 
averagely RM20 per month per household (i.e., RM240 per 
year). Hence total fund requires per year is about RM3.25 
billion, almost equivalent to 2% of total fiscal expenditure in 
states in 2017. Additional fund allocated from sin and luxury 
taxes can be used as administrative and extra supports to B40, 
or part of it can be carried forward to the subsequent year.
This study aims to demonstrate how to distribute the pool 
of financial resources allocated from 2% of fiscal expenditure 
from national and state governments. The calculated total 
amount is RM3.2 billion, which is reallocated to every state 
according to figures shown in the first column from the right 
of Table 4. These figures are derived by: weighted average 
of total expenditure after transfer adjustment (from Table 
3) with respect to T-score (adjusted expenditure in a normal 
distribution) in 2017; each result is then divided by the total 
in the third column from right to obtain each respective share; 
it is then multiply by the total sum required to support B40, 
viz., RM3.2 billion or RM3,200 million. The gap between the 
highest and the lowest is about RM72 million, not a large figure 
to be alarmed about. The number of households in B40 is not 
evenly spread in every state. Therefore the allocated amount 
in one state might be either more than the actual requirement 
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or less than the required sum. The differential between states is 
cancelled off by transferring surplus of one state to fill up the 
deficiency in another state. Figure 1 illustrates this equalizing 
approach. Supporting B40 by fiscal resources pools from both 
national and state government expenditures is equitable, fair 
and socially just. CCT as the approach is practical, transparent, 
accountable and fair in assisting B40 to at least be able to 
acquire basic human needs without which their meager livings 
will persist.
Poverty is not a new problem. National government 
had intervened to correct this miserable situation but has yet 
to eliminate it entirely. Hence, presently it still is providing 
financial support to B40. Here are a few instances. If an 
individual in B40 is eligible, he/she can receive RM112 in 
social protection insurance payment. Also, when an individual 
in B40 was diagnosed with critical illness, he/she is able to 
receive unrepeatable treatment up to RM8,000. At the same 
time, Bank Negara is giving special financial assistance to 
people in B40 to acquire affordable homes. Single Malaysians 
can apply from Micro-Homes (RM100), whereas stamp duty 
for first time home purchaser is exempted. The assistances are 
specific but it is still early to carry out practical review of their 
effectiveness. Social economic problems in B40 are multi-
dimensional. Therefore, added emphasis on these problems 
and the urgency to attain convincing results are vital to keep 
the momentum of continuous assistance.
 Present support schemes focus on who are eligible in 
B40. Eligibility or qualification is no doubt important but the 
probability of realizing predicted results might not necessarily 
high. Supporters certainly assert the limitation is inevitable 
if there was no better alternative. However, not everyone, 
especially taxpayers, must assume aid certainly will deliver 
intended results because operational plans are generally 
formulated based on “known knowledge,” hence consequently 
they are expected to be executed as planned (with necessarily 
adjustments when deemed required) in order to achieve good 
results. This “if-then” hypothesis does not function as intended 
whenever there is “unknown known” knowledge that engulfs 
the depressed living of B40. Life is in fact full of uncertainties. 
There are even more unknowns, unpredictable and unexpected 
events posing critical challenges to B40, at least especially to 
the lower B40 in moving up to a higher income within the 
group. Hence the effectiveness of the financial support for B40 
requires objective assessment of results instead of based on 
the execution per se. Giving support per se does not guarantee 
improvement but adapting CCT mechanism can certainly 
strengthen the effectiveness.
CCT is a unique mechanism for improving the living of 
targeted beneficiaries in B40. This mechanism uses a specific 
behavioral condition̶which has positive spill over effect̶
for verifying whether a targeted beneficiary has achieved 
the specific result as anticipated. The result is specifically 
determined by the assistance plan prior to its actual 
implementation. In other words, targeted beneficiaries must 
abide by the specific behavioral condition in order to qualify 
for receiving the financial aid. The degree of achievement 
ranges from 0% to 100%. Therefore, financial disbursement 
to targeted beneficiaries can be divided into several categories. 
Here are several elements that are useful specific 
behavioral conditions for the CCT mechanism. For example, 
children’s school attendance rate, children’s and adults’ health 
condition, parents’ subsistence income per week, voluntary 
contribution rate, and visible and fair behavioral actions. If the 
financial assistance to a household is assumed to be RM200 
per household in a month, then each household is entitled to 
RM50 assistance per week. If children in a household would 
have achieved 100% school attendance rate, the family 
receives RM50. For 80%, 70%, 60% then the financial support 
is RM40, RM30, RM20, respectively. Financial assistance 
is zero for children’s school attendance rate less than 60%. 
This conditional assistance not only encourages children to 
attend school, which in turn enhances their literacy rate in 
primary and middle school level (i.e., compulsory education). 
Similar modus operandi is applicable to other behavioral 
conditions listed above. In this manner, CCT is more effective 
than the conventional unconditional cash transfer scheme. 
Some supporters might contend there is still a relatively 
high possibility the latter will produce effective results. This 
view certainly has its merit and thus there is no compulsion 
for agreeing to disagree. However, this paper underlines the 
former is even more effective for at least two reasons, viz., 
specific behavioral conditions are clearer and easier for 
measuring effectiveness and CCT helps to save financial 
resources that can be reallocated to other areas of concerned 
in B40. Elimination of poverty and it enhances the wellbeing 
of citizens in B40 are not only a difficult task for national and 
state governments but it is neither a pleasant one for every 
individuals in Malaysia too. The result may fall short of the 
intended goal but the endeavor in elevating a few millions 
people to a decent and dignified livelihood is the immovable 
obligation.
Ignoring poorer of the poor or abject poverty in B40 is also 
morally unacceptable. Extending our hands̶co-responsibility 
at national, state and local levels̶to them is of utmost priority 
for achieving a more inclusive, equitable, fair and socially just 
society. Building Malaysia Baru where poverty alleviation 
requires every citizen’s resolute commitment in the provision 
of basic needs such as food, education, health and sanitation, 
hygienic water and clean air to B40 group. Otherwise, 
achieving the status of advanced country where everyone lives 
in effective, efficient, fair, equitable and socially just society 
is simply a wish that might not come true (Lau, 2013, pp. 4-5).
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６．Conclusion
The proposed fiscal federalism is a new initiative that deserves 
serious consideration by the legislation. Since the formation of 
Malaysia, maintaining in the comfort zone with less political 
troubles is to practice a highly centralized tax system, which 
has become the precedent for majority of legislators. National 
government has persistently taken advantage of that mentality, 
which consequently has brought about a fiscal expenditure that 
has been less efficient, less fairness and lower equity, less just, 
and less efficient in utilizing fiscal expenditures for more than 
half a century. Fiscal policy influences economic performance 
in a country. It especially focuses on demand side with policy 
approaches from fiscal revenues and expenditures. Fiscal 
federalism is a tax system that focuses on shared responsibility 
between national and local governments or cooperative 
relation between national and state governments in managing 
tax revenues and expenditures.
This study stresses the urgency of transforming the 
present centralized tax system to the decentralized one because 
the Federal Constitution specifies Malaysia is a federation. In 
spite of the Federation Constitution, tax system was and still is 
practically a centralized system. Fiscal federalism is a powerful 
tool to strengthen social wellbeing in Malaysia Baru based on 
efficiency, fairness, equity, and socially just redistribution of 
fiscal resources from national to state governments. Equally 
important, this result reduces the intensity of centralization ratio 
between national and state governments. This transformation 
will not only enhance economic efficiency but also promote 
better vertical equity, horizontal equity, generational equity, 
and proportional equity by direct taxes (income tax, real 
property gains tax, stamp duty) and also by indirect taxes (sales 
and service tax, export duty, import duty, excise tax, sin and 
luxury tax). The paper also proposes the needs to improve EPF 
(a force saving scheme), unemployment insurance, universal 
health care, conditional cash transfer scheme for supporting 
B40̶the lowest income group. Fiscal resources equalization 
by fiscal federalism improves efficiency in fiscal reallocation 
from national to state governments, which in turn brings about 
a higher level of fairness in redistribution. Therefore these 
efforts produce Pareto optimal in efficiency and fairness.
The establishment of a tax system for fiscal federalism is 
not a difficult task but it requires a strong political commitment 
in the legislation. The transformation will face challenges in 
the new landscape where terrain has pockets of uncertainties. 
The navigation requires concerted efforts from all stakeholders 
and it also demands extra prudence too. “The care of the 
health, of the fortune, of the rank and reputation of the 
individual, the objects upon which his comfort and happiness 
in this life are supposed principally to depend, is considered 
as the proper business of that virtue which is commonly called 
Prudence………The prudent man always studies seriously and 
earnestly to understand whatever he professes to understand, 
and not merely to persuade other people that he understands 
it; and though his talents may not always be very brilliant, 
they are always perfectly genuine” (Adam Smith, 1759, p. 192, 
cited in Lau, op. cit., p. 17).
The proposed federal tax system ought to be well 
planned, professionally and effectively executed along with 
regular check follow with better actions by the legislative and 
executive branches as well as by taxpayers and users. This is 
the framework of PDCA̶plan, do, check and action. The 
demand of resources is huge, if not unlimited, but the supply 
is constrained in reality. As such, national government must 
decide policy priorities based on the cost and effectiveness 
under a hard budget constrain. Especially both execution 
and legislation branches ought to clearly explain the aim, 
anticipated outcome, and detailed operational aspects of every 
policy to the public with transparency and accountability. “Ask 
not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do 
for your country” (John F. Kennedy, 20 January 1961). This 
statement is true not only to the rakyat’s representatives but 
to all Malaysians. This paper fervently hopes Malaysia Baru 
will navigate with confident in the elevated landscape where 
every rakyat will have a better wellbeing in not a distantly far 
horizon.
No one wants to dispute that globalization means 
economy openness. This process at least implies to the extent 
of borderless economy. The supporters insist that economy 
openness or free trade pushes up competitiveness but they have 
not examined its shadow sufficiently. The shadow comprises 
situation where government losses room for maneuvering 
policy intervention to support vulnerable citizens who are 
unable to surf along with globalization waves. Put differently, 
while government encourages free trade on one hand, it losses 
the control of policy that add misery to vulnerable people 
who live in the sovereign territory on other hand. Rodrick 
(2007) shows that the nation state, democratic politics and 
deep integration are in a triangular relation but these ideals 
also create a “trilemma” in political economy. Openness brings 
about deep economic integration. Democratic politics promote 
policies that support free trade and enhanced competitiveness 
in international market place. However, nation state is the 
foundation for democratic politics but it is against immoral 
and unethical competition that produces a large share of the 
have not that defeats the greater good of fairness and equality 
within the sovereign territory. Hence two elements can be 
mutually inclusive but not three. Democratic politics enhances 
deep integration and vice versa but nation state does not 
respond to deep economic integration because it is obliged 
to support a large group of vulnerable citizens̶both before 
and after intense competition in global markets. Nation state 
and democratic politics are also mutually inclusive if deep 
economic integration is not included.
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The reality in and outside our homeland poses many 
difficult challenges to 32 million people. This paper does 
not cover every details of fiscal federalism but it has at least 
highlighted its core essence in order to generate greater 
awareness of the need for transformation in the new terrain 
flourishes with tons of harapan in Malaysia Baru. Last but 
not least, fiscal federalism is the de jure and not the de facto 
centralized tax system. Ben Bradlee, who was closed to J. 
Kennedy, and then he was the VP of Washington Post said, 
"Today is good, tomorrow is better." This inspires me to make 
the following statement. "Malaysia is good today, tomorrow it 
is the Better Malaysia” (Lau, op. cit., p. 17).
（Received: 10 January 2020 Published: 15 November 2019）
Table 1　Sources of Revenue Assigned to States
1 Revenue from toddy shops.
2 Revenue from lands mines and forests.
3
Revenue from licenses other than those connected with water supplies and services, mechanically propelled vehicles, electrical installations and 
registration of businesses
4 Entertainments duty.
5 Fees in courts other than federal courts.
6 Fees and receipts in respect of specific services rendered by departments of the State Governments.
7 Revenue of town boards, town councils, rural boards, local councils and similar local authorites other than:
(a) municipalities established under any municipal Ordinance;
(b)  those town boards, town councils, rural boards, local councils and similar local authorities which have power under written law to retain their 
revenue and control the spending thereof.
8 Receipts in respect of raw water.
9 Rents on State property.
10 Interest on State balances.
11 Receipts from land sales and sales of State property.
12 Fines and forfeitures in courts other than federal courts.
13 Zakat, Fitrah and Baituhmal and similar Islamic religious revenue.
14 Treasure trove.
Source: Federal Constitution, Tenth Schedule Part III, PP. 204-205
Table 2　Comparison of Consolidated Federal and State Governments Financial Position (million RM)
2016 2017 2018
(A) Consolidated federal government financial position* 225,550 265,362 279,019
(B) Consolidated state governments financial position* 19,631 19,692 n/a
Intensity of centralization ([B]/[A]) 8.70% 7.42%
* includes grant and transfer, development expenditure
Source: Ministry of Finance, Public Sector Finance, pp. 93-94 (retrieved from https://www.treasury.gov.my/pdf/
economy/er/1718/chapter4.pdf).
Table 3　Calculation of fiscal equalization based on actual expenditures in 2017 (Billion RM)
A B C D
2017 Z－score T－score
Share with 
respect to  
2017 total
C x 2017 
(=additional 
transfer)
Total expenditure 
after transfer 
adjustment 
=(2017+D)
Sarawak 6.90 　2.71 7.71 0.0373   2.43   9.33 Sarawak
Sabah 3.90 　1.16 6.16 0.1039   6.75 10.65 Sabah
Selangor 2.80 　0.59 5.59 0.1284   8.34 11.14 Selangor
Terengganu 2.10 　0.22 5.22 0.1439   9.35 11.45 Terengganu
Johor 1.60 －0.04 4.96 0.1550 10.07 11.67 Johor
Perak 1.10 －0.30 4.70 0.1661 10.80 11.90 Perak
Penang 0.80 －0.45 4.55 0.1728 11.23 12.03 Penang
Kedah 0.60 －0.55 4.45 0.1772 11.52 12.12 Kedah
Kelantan 0.60 －0.55 4.45 0.1772 11.52 12.12 Kelantan
Pahang 0.50 －0.61 4.39 0.1794 11.66 12.16 Pahang
N. Sembilan 0.40 －0.66 4.34 0.1817 11.81 12.21 N. Sembilan
Melaka 0.30 －0.71 4.29 0.1839 11.95 12.25 Melaka
Perlis 0.10 －0.81 4.19 0.1883 12.24 12.34 Perlis
Average   1.67   5.00
Std. dev.   1.93   1.00
Var.   3.71   1.00
Total 21.70 64.99 129.66 151.36
1. Multiple between 2017 (actual expenditures) and adjusted fiscal expenditure is about 6.0 (redistributed values=129.66/21.7).
2. Post redistributed State Governments new expenditure position increased from 7.42% (Table 2) to 57.04%.
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Table 4　Allocation of contribution from national and state governments for CCT in B40
Weighted average of total 
expenditure after transfer 
adjustment (with respect 
to T-score (adjusted 
expenditure) in 2017
Total expenditure after 
transfer adjustment in 
2017-Weighted average, 
RM Million
(A)
Share
 (state expenditure/total)
Resources contributed 
from national and state 
governments
 (A*3,200 mil)
RM Million
1.33 3,200
Sarawak   7,995 0.0596 190.83
Sabah   9,325 0.0695 222.56
Selangor   9,812 0.0732 234.19
Terengganu 10,123 0.0755 241.60
Johor 10,344 0.0772 246.89
Perak 10,566 0.0788 252.17
Penang 10,699 0.0798 255.35
Kedah 10,787 0.0805 257.46
Kelantan 10,787 0.0805 257.46
Pahang 10,832 0.0808 258.52
N. Sembilan 10,876 0.0811 259.58
Melaka 10,920 0.0814 260.64
Perlis 11,009 0.0821 262.75
Total 134,075 1 3,200
Source: computed by author from Table 3
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Figure 1　Filling the gaps from surpluses (based on distributed scale in Table 4)
Note: the number of households in B40 is not evenly distributed in every state.
Source: compiled by author based on a hypothetical condition.
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Abstract
The Federal Constitution specifies Malaysia is a federation. But the formulation and the execution of fiscal expenditure were and 
still are practically controlled by national government. It is constitutionally right for enhancing the identity of the reborn homeland 
where the government and rakyat in Malaysia Baru are in need of a fiscal system that can foster their endeavors in securing not only 
a desirable but also a higher welfare standard set up by efficiency, fairness, effectiveness, equity, and social justice. Fiscal Federalism 
is the path to derive the answer. Against this backdrop, this paper intends to examine how fiscal federalism can facilitate the desirable 
state of resource allocations that brings better wellbeing in national and states level.
In a democratic country, the decision of establishing and of executing fiscal federalism, which is [guaranteed by the Federal 
Constitution], is politically doable. The proposed fiscal federalism is a new initiative that deserves serious consideration by the 
legislation. Fiscal policy influences economic performance in a country. It especially focuses on demand side with policy approaches 
from fiscal revenues and expenditures. Fiscal federalism is a tax system that focuses on shared responsibility between national and 
local governments or cooperative relation between national and state governments in managing tax revenues and expenditures. 
This study shows federal federalism could reduce centralization ratio, i.e., ratio of consolidated state governments financial 
position with respect to national’s. The calculated result shows it improved from 7.4% to 57.4% in 2017 by fiscal equalization. 
Market failure persists in a market-based economic system. Therefore, government ought to intervene to correct it by the principles 
of progressive, regressive, and proportional taxes on the one hand, and vertical equity, horizontal equity, and generational equity on 
the other hand. Furthermore, fiscal equalization leads to more efficient, more efficient, a higher fairness, and it also enhances equity 
and social justice. 
This study stresses in spite of the federation constitution, tax system was and still is practically a centralized system since 
the formation of Malaysia. Fiscal federalism is a powerful tool to strengthen social wellbeing in Malaysia Baru. This paper also 
proposes the needs to improve employees provident fund (EPF, a force saving scheme), unemployment insurance, universal health 
care, conditional cash transfer scheme for supporting B40̶lowest income group. Fiscal resources equalization by fiscal federalism 
improves efficiency in fiscal reallocation from national to state governments, which in turn brings about a higher level of fairness in 
redistribution. Therefore these efforts produce Pareto optimal in efficiency and fairness.
The reality in and outside our homeland poses many difficult challenges to 32 million people. This paper has highlighted the core 
essence in order to generate greater awareness of the need for positive changes in the new terrain flourishes with tons of harapan in 
Malaysia Baru. Finally, just as importantly, this study emphasizes fiscal federalism is the de jure and not the de facto centralized tax 
system.
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